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Observing other people’s actions activates a network of brain
regions that is also activated during the execution of these actions.
Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test
whether these ‘‘mirror’’ regions in frontal and parietal cortices
primarily encode the spatiomotor aspects or the functional goal-
related aspects of observed tool actions. Participants viewed static
depictions of actions consisting of a tool object (e.g., key) and
a target object (e.g., keyhole). They judged the actions either with
regard to whether the objects were oriented correctly for the action
to succeed (spatiomotor task) or whether an action goal could be
achieved with the objects (function task). Compared with a control
condition, both tasks activated regions in left frontoparietal cortex
previously implicated in action observation and execution. Of these
regions, the premotor cortex and supramarginal gyrus were pri-
marily activated during the spatiomotor task, whereas the middle
frontal gyrus was primarily activated during the function task. Re-
gions along the intraparietal sulcus were more strongly activated
during the spatiomotor task but only when the spatiomotor prop-
erties of the tool object were unknown in advance. These results
suggest a division of labor within the action observation network
that maps onto a similar division previously proposed for action
execution.
Keywords: intraparietal sulcus, middle frontal gyrus, mirror neurons,
premotor cortex, tool use
Introduction
What sets human action apart from even our closest relatives in
the animal kingdom is the capacity for complex tool use (cf.
Johnson-Frey 2003). The ability to act ‘‘with’’ objects rather
than just ‘‘on’’ them has unlocked a vast range of effects humans
can produce in the environment (e.g., Johnson-Frey and
Grafton 2003). Great strides forward have been made in iden-
tifying the brain systems that guide tool actions (for reviews,
see Johnson-Frey et al. 2005; Lewis 2006), but it is unclear how
this important class of actions is understood when observed.
Complex tool use differs from simple object-directed actions
(e.g., grasping) in that successful action requires not only a
visual alignment of hand and goal object but also the applica-
tion of learned knowledge about proper object use (e.g.,
Buxbaum 2001; Johnson-Frey and Grafton 2003). This knowl-
edge appears to be hierarchically organized, linking action
goals both to the objects that have to be used and to the motor
behaviors that have to be performed with these objects for the
action to be successful (e.g., Nowak et al. 2000; Lindemann
et al. 2006; Grafton and Hamilton 2007; Botvinick et al. 2009).
For instance, to unlock a door, one needs to correctly insert
(the motor act) a key (the tool). The distinction between
proper object selection and proper motor performance fea-
tures prominently in models of action production (e.g., Milner
and Goodale 1995; Oztop and Arbib 2002; Lindemann et al.
2006; Botvinick et al. 2009). The use of both kinds of know-
ledge during tool use is demonstrated by patients who can
either select the appropriate tools for a task but fail to use them
correctly or vice versa (e.g., brushing teeth with a comb), while
grasping is often unaffected (e.g., Ochipa et al. 1989; Sirigu et al.
1991; Buxbaum and Saffran 1998; Hodges et al. 1999).
It has been proposed that, conversely, observers can derive
the goal of an observed action if the action’s perceivable
attributes—the motor behaviors performed and the objects
used—can be mapped onto the control hierarchy that also
guides its production (e.g., Bach et al. 2005; Grafton and
Hamilton 2007). Evidence for this view comes from the ﬁnding
that the observation of motor acts engages a network of re-
gions that is also centrally involved in the spatiomotor control
of these actions, such as the ventral and dorsal premotor
cortices (PMC), as well as regions along the left postcentral and
intraparietal sulci (IPS) (e.g., di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Iacoboni
et al. 1999; Buccino et al. 2001; Gre`zes et al. 2003; Rozzi
et al. 2008; for tool actions, see Manthey et al. 2003;
Baumgaertner et al. 2007). However, these so-called mirror
networks appear to represent the actions primarily in terms of
their spatiomotor aspects, such as trajectory and hand posture
information (e.g., Hamilton and Grafton 2006; Lestou et al.
2008), but do not appear to take the identity of the objects
used into account (Nelissen et al. 2005; Shmuelof and Zohary
2006). They are involved even when tool actions are
pantomimed without objects (Buxbaum et al. 2005; Villarreal
et al. 2008) or when skilled dance movements are observed
(Calvo-Merino et al. 2005; Cross et al. 2006), consistent with
a mapping based on the actions’ spatiomotor properties.
It therefore remains unresolved which regions mediate the
inﬂuence of object identity on action observation. If human
action representations link action goals not only to the
required motor behaviors but also to the objects that have to
be used, then object identity might be a second source of
information about the action’s goal. Indeed, both behavioral
and electrophysiological studies conﬁrm that humans naturally
infer the meaning and goals of an action from the objects used
(e.g., Sitnikova et al. 2003; Bach et al. 2005, 2008; Boria et al.
2009). Moreover, because objects—and the goals that can be
achieved with them—are linked to speciﬁc motor behaviors
that have to be performed (e.g., Goodale and Humphrey 1998;
Creem and Profﬁtt 2001), object information may also bias the
spatiomotor action observation processes toward the particular
motor acts that are required in a given situation. Indeed, in
a recent behavioral study, we found that the identities of the
objects involved in a seen action determined both whether
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a goal-based representation of the action could be established
and facilitated judgments of whether the tool was applied
correctly to the goal object for the action to succeed (Bach
et al. 2005; see also Riddoch et al. 2003; Green and Hummel
2006; van Elk et al. 2008).
Here, we investigate the pathways via which object in-
formation determines both goal and spatiomotor representa-
tions of observed tool actions. We hypothesize that these
processes draw upon the same representations that also supply
knowledge about proper tool selection and use during action
production. Knowledge about how to act with objects appears
to rely on a left-hemispheric network comprising parietal,
temporal, and prefrontal regions (for a review, see Johnson-
Frey 2004). Anterior and posterior regions in the temporal lobe
act as general repositories for semantic/functional knowledge
and visual information about objects (e.g., Hodges et al. 2000;
Kellenbach et al. 2003; Ebisch et al. 2007; Canessa et al. 2008).
In contrast, lesion and imaging studies have indicated that 2
regions are central for applying this knowledge ‘‘in action’’: the
left middle frontal gyrus (mFG) and regions along the IPS (e.g.,
Rumiati et al. 2004; Johnson-Frey et al. 2005; for reviews, see
Koski et al. 2002; Frey 2007). Lesions in both areas produce
ideomotor apraxia and deﬁcits in accessing skilled tool know-
ledge (Haaland et al. 2000; Goldenberg and Spatt 2009) but
often leave grasping unaffected. These regions have therefore
been identiﬁed with the human ‘‘acting with’’ system that
guides learned actions with tools in contrast to the more basic
‘‘acting on’’ system that guides the more basic spatiomotor
alignments required for grasping (Johnson-Frey and Grafton
2003; see also Buxbaum 2001).
Of these areas, the regions along the IPS are strongly as-
sociated with storing speciﬁc motor patterns relevant for using
a tool, such as the hand postures required for its use, or which
parts are relevant for action (e.g., Buxbaum et al. 2006, 2007).
In contrast, the mFG appears to represent action knowledge
associated with a tool on a relatively high and abstract level. It
supports the planning but not the actual performance of tool
actions (Johnson-Frey et al. 2005) and mediates all aspects of
the action knowledge associated with a tool, be it the actions
that can be performed with it, their functional and spatiomotor
properties (Grabowski et al. 1998; Ebisch et al. 2007; Weisberg
et al. 2007), and the typical goal objects they have to be applied
to (Goldenberg and Spatt 2009). The mFG may therefore hold
relatively high-level representations of tool actions, linking the
use of tools to potential action goals, as well as to the proper
ways to perform the associated motor behaviors.
The Present Study
This study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to identify the pathways via which the objects used determine
both goal and spatiomotor representations of observed tool
actions. Participants were presented with 2-frame sequences of
tool actions (see Fig. 1 for examples), consisting of a hand
holding a tool (e.g., a key) and a goal object (e.g., a keyhole).
The task was varied between blocks of trials to engage regions
establishing either a spatiomotor or a goal-related representa-
tion of the observed action. First, in the ‘‘function task,’’ par-
ticipants judged whether the tool and goal object could be
used together to achieve an action goal. This task should
engage regions that establish a representation of the actions’
goal based on the identity of the objects involved in the actions.
Second, the ‘‘space task’’ was designed to engage regions
establishing a spatiomotor representation of how the in-
strument is applied to the goal object. Here, participants had
to judge whether tool and goal object were applied to one
another correctly spatially. This task should engage regions that
derive a spatiomotor description of how the objects are applied
to one another based on knowledge on how the objects should
be used. Importantly, both tasks were performed on exactly the
same stimulus sequences. Any differences observed are there-
fore not due to stimulus differences but due to the participants’
attentional focus on either the functional or the spatiomotor
aspects of the observed actions.
Participants performed these tasks in 2 action observation
conditions and in 1 control condition (varied between runs).
In the control condition, participants made similar judgments
of object sequences that did not form prototypical actions but
which were nevertheless semantically/functionally related
(e.g., a soap bar and a shampoo bottle). The control condition
was used to restrict our analysis to regions involved in action
observation, as opposed to those more generally involved in
processing spatial and semantic/functional object properties.
The 2 action observation conditions were designed to fur-
ther subdivide the regions involved in the space task between
regions involved in establishing a spatiomotor description of
how the objects are applied to one another based on their
directly perceivable attributes and those involved in deriving
how the tool should in fact be oriented for the action to
succeed. In the ﬁrst action observation condition, ‘‘insertion
action,’’ only insertion actions were presented, such as the
insertion of a key into a keyhole or of a coin into a slot of a
vending machine. Due to this stereotypicality of the presented
actions, the space task in the insertion action condition could
therefore be performed on the available visual information
alone: by comparing whether the tool has the correct
orientation for insertion into the goal object, without the need
to access object-based action knowledge. This was not the case
in the second action observation condition, ‘‘tool action.’’ Here,
Figure 1. Example stimuli for correct actions in the 3 stimulation conditions and the
respective mismatches. For illustration purposes, instruments and goal objects are
combined in one frame but were presented separately in the experiment (see Fig. 2).
Left column (insertion action condition): coin inserted into vending machine with
correct orientation, coin inserted into vending machine with incorrect orientation, and
safety belt inserted into the vending machine. Middle column (tool action condition):
hole puncher applied to paper in correct orientation, hole puncher applied to paper in
incorrect orientation, and sponge being applied to paper. Right column (object control
condition): compact disc and music cassette with same orientations, compact disc
and music cassette with different orientations, and compact disc and jar of honey.
Cerebral Cortex December 2010, V 20 N 12 2799
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a more variable set of actions was presented, such as cutting
a piece of paper with scissors or cleaning a plate with a sponge.
Crucially, the tools were chosen so that each had to be applied to
the goal object differently for the action to succeed. For instance,
whereas a sponge should have the same orientation as the to-be
cleaned plate, the scissors should be oriented orthogonally to the
piece of paper one wants to cut. Thus, although the insertion
action conditionminimizes the need for knowledge about how to
act with the given objects, this knowledge is critical for the space
task in the tool action condition. Comparing these conditionswill
therefore allow us to dissociate regions that establish how the
seen objects are actually applied to one another (necessary in
both conditions) from those regions that derive how an action
with the speciﬁc objects should be performed for the action’s
goal to be achieved (only necessary in the tool action condition).
Note that the stronger reliance on object-based action
knowledge in the tool action condition has been conﬁrmed in
behavioral studies using the same tasks and stimuli (Bach et al.
2005). There, we argued that knowledge about how to use an
object can be derived in 2 ways. First, there is evidence that
seeing objects automatically activates posterior parietal regions
representing tool-speciﬁc motor knowledge (e.g., Buxbaum
et al. 2007; Mahon et al. 2007). Such regions should show a
speciﬁc involvement in the space task of the tool action con-
dition but not in the insertion action condition. A second
possibility is that knowledge about how to align the objects can
also be derived from higher level goal-related representations
of the actions, hypothesized for the mFG in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. There is evidence that such goal-related
action representations are directly tied to the relevant motor
behaviors required for the actions to succeed (Bach et al. 2005;
Ebisch et al. 2007; van Elk et al. 2008). If this is the case, then
regions that establish such high-level action representations in
the function task should also be activated in the space task of
the tool action condition.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifteen participants, all students at the Bangor University, United
Kingdom, took part in the experiment and were paid for their
participation (£20). They ranged in age from 18 to 34 years, were right-
handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They satisﬁed all
requirements in volunteer screening and gave informed consent. The
study was approved by the School of Psychology at the Bangor
University, United Kingdom, and the North West Wales Health Trust
and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
For each of the 3 stimulation conditions (tool action, insertion action,
and object control), a separate set of stimulus sequences was created
(see Supplementary Table 1 for a complete list of sequences in each
condition). In all conditions, these sequences consisted of 2 photo-
graphs that were presented brieﬂy (300 ms, ISI = 200 ms), with the ﬁrst
showing an object held in a hand and the second showing a potential
goal object. In the insertion action condition, these sequences depicted
insertion actions, such as the insertion of a key in a keyhole or the
insertion of a ticket in a ticket canceler. Because all actions were
inserting actions, proper motor performance in this condition required
identical orientations of insert and slot of the goal objects. In the tool
action condition, the sequences depicted more complex actions of tool
use, such as hole punching a stack of papers or cleaning a plate with
a sponge. In order to ensure that in these sequences the proper spatial
relationship was not predictable, the stimuli were chosen so that one-
half of the actions required identical orientations of tool and goal object
(e.g., sponge and plate), while the other half required orthogonal
orientations (e.g., scissors and piece of paper). Finally, the object
control condition consisted of 2 objects that did not imply an action
but that were nevertheless functionally related, such as a compact disc
and an audiocassette or a bottle of milk and a bottle of orange juice (see
Fig. 1 for examples).
The sequences in each condition were assembled from 32 different
photographs. Of these 32 pictures, 16 showed a hand holding 1 of 8
objects, either vertically or horizontally. The other 16 pictures showed
8 corresponding goal objects, again either vertically or horizontally.
Fully matching actions were created by combining a functionally
appropriate tool and a goal object in the correct orientations for action.
Spatially mismatching actions were created by combining this tool with
an appropriate object but of an inappropriate orientation. Functionally
mismatching actions were created by combining the tool with an
inappropriate goal object that has an appropriate orientation (see Fig. 1
for examples). Thus, there were 64 possible action sequences in each
stimulation condition.
The stimuli used in the action observation conditions have been
extensively tested in prior studies. A rating task conﬁrmed that the
stimuli indeed strongly evoke the actions’ goals (Bach et al. 2005).
Moreover, these studies show that the response times (RTs) are very
comparable across the space and function tasks in the insertion action
condition, suggesting similar perceptual processing demands. In the
tool action condition, longer RTs in the space task are found, following
the prediction of a more complex space task that requires the prior
processing of goal/object information (Bach et al. 2005).
Static images were used because they allow for efﬁcient experimental
manipulation of objects and orientations. Furthermore, there is
considerable evidence that the processing of static images of actions
in many respects resembles that of full-action displays. For example, the
motion implied by actions presented in static images is extracted
automatically (Proverbio et al. 2009) and activates motion-selective
brain areas (e.g., Kourtzi and Kanwisher 2000). Moreover, evidence from
behavioral (e.g., Stu¨rmer et al. 2000), imaging (e.g., Johnson-Frey et al.
2003), and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies (Urgesi et al. 2006)
indicate that actions in static displays are mapped onto the observers’
motor system in a similar manner as those in full-motion displays.
Task
In the space task of the action conditions, participants judged whether
tool and goal object were applied to one another correctly. They had to
report mismatches in which the orientations of instrument and goal
object were not appropriate (e.g., a vertically oriented key inserted into
a keyhole with a horizontal slot). In the function task of the action
conditions, participants judged whether the tool and goal object could
be used together to achieve an action goal. Participants had to report
mismatches in which no goal could be derived because the tool was
applied to an inappropriate object (e.g., a screwdriver rather than a key
is inserted into the keyhole).
In the space task of the control condition, the participants had to
detect mismatches in which the physical orientation of the 2 objects
was different (e.g., vertical CD and horizontal music cassette). In the
function task of the control condition, they had to detect mismatches
in which the 2 objects were not used in the same contexts (e.g., a milk
bottle and a piece of soap). As such, the tasks in the control condition
were based on the same component processes as those in the action
observation conditions (i.e., deriving object orientation and semantic
object knowledge). However, since the stimuli neither depicted typical
actions nor required action judgments of the participants, they did not
require processing the stimuli as actions. The control condition should
therefore capture particularly the basic spatial/semantic object analysis
processes common to both the action observation and the control
condition but not those processes that are speciﬁc to the action
understanding tasks.
Procedure
Before the experiment, all participants were informed about their task
and were familiarized with the stimuli so that all objects were
recognized before the scanning session. We also ensured that the
participants understood the difference between the tool action and the
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insertion action conditions (i.e., that all actions in the insertion action
condition would be insertion actions and could therefore be judged in
the same manner but that this was not possible in the tool action
conditions, where the proper way to apply instrument and goal object
had to be derived from the objects used). This explicit instruction was
given to prevent entrainment effects, such that participants would
neither be surprised by the more complex tool action task after com-
pletion of the insertion action condition nor, conversely, would go on
using the more complex unnecessary strategy of the tool action
condition in the insertion action condition.
Subjects then performed 6 runs of the experiment (see Fig. 2 for the
complete structure of the experiment). In each run, they saw se-
quences from one stimulation condition exclusively (insertion action,
tool action, and object control). The order of stimulation conditions
followed an ABCABC order and was counterbalanced across subjects. At
the start of each run, participants were informed via an on-screen
instruction about the stimuli they would see. They would then see 24
short (15 s) blocks of 5 actions each (120 actions altogether). Each
block started with a 2-s cue that notiﬁed the participants about their
task in this block (indicated by the words ‘‘space,’’ ‘‘function,’’ and
‘‘passive viewing’’). Data from the passive viewing conditions were not
further analyzed because subjects reported that they failed to
consistently pay attention to the stimuli in this condition. Task order
was counterbalanced across runs. In each of the 5 trials within a block,
one of the 2-frame stimulus sequences was shown for 800 ms (with
300 ms for each photograph, 200 ms ISI). At the end of each block (i.e.,
after 5 trials), subjects had to report how many relevant mismatches
they had observed by pressing a button as often as the number of
mismatches they had identiﬁed. Compared with go--no go paradigms,
this task temporally separates action observation and overt motor
responses and ensures that any observed responses in sensorimotor
areas do not simply reﬂect the participants’ requirement to process the
action with regard to an immediate motor goal (e.g., making or
withholding a response). Mismatches were rare; of the 480 actions the
participants judged in the experiment, on average, every eighth action
contained either a spatial or a functional mismatch (60 trials total).
Mismatches were distributed over the 5-action blocks so that a mis-
match had to be reported on average every 3 blocks of actions. Spatial
and functional mismatches occurred equally often in both tasks.
After the experiment was ﬁnished, all participants ﬁlled out a
questionnaire (described in detail in Bach et al. 2005) and rated each
action with respect to 1) how apparent the action’s goal was, 2) how
much visuomotor experience they have had with the actions, and 3)
how strongly the instruments and goal objects were associated.
Data Acquisition and Analysis
All data were acquired on a 1.5T Philips MRI scanner, equipped with a
parallel head coil. For functional imaging, an echo-planar imaging
sequence was used (time repetition [TR] = 3000 ms, time echo = 50 ms,
ﬂip angle = 90, and ﬁeld of view = 192, 30 axial slices, 64 3 64 in-plane
matrix, 4 mm slice thickness). The scanned area covered the whole
cortex and most of the cerebellum. Preprocessing and statistical analysis
ofmagnetic resonance imaging datawere performed using BrainVoyager
4.9 and QX (Brain Innovation). Functional data were motion corrected
and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (6-mm full-width at half-
maximum), and low-frequency drifts were removed with a temporal
high-pass ﬁlter (0.006 Hz). Functional data were manually coregistered
with 3D anatomical T1 scans (1 3 1 3 1.3 mm resolution) and then
resampled to isometric 3 3 3 3 3 mm voxels with trilinear interpolation.
The 3D scans were transformed into Talairach space (Talairach and
Tournoux 1988), and the parameters for this transformation were
subsequently applied to the coregistered functional data.
In order to generate predictors for the multiple regression analyses,
the event time series for each condition were convolved with a delayed
gamma function (delta = 2.5 s; tau = 1.25 s). Six predictors of interest
were used to model the 2 tasks and the 3 stimulus conditions (space-
tools, space-inserts, space-objects, function-tools, function-inserts, and
function-objects). Seven additional predictors of no interest were
included to model the effect of the 2 mismatches in the 3 stimulation
conditions. The ﬁrst six of these additional predictors modeled the
mismatches in each condition separately (space-tools, space-inserts,
space-objects, function-tools, function-inserts, and function-objects),
and the seventh was an additional predictor for modeling the effects of
the relevant mismatches (i.e., spatial mismatches in the space task and
functional mismatches in the function task). Voxel time series were z
normalized for each run, and additional predictors accounting for
baseline differences between runs were included in the design matrix.
The regressors were ﬁtted to the MR time series in each voxel. Whole-
brain random-effects contrasts were corrected for multiple compar-
isons using the false discovery rate (FDR) approach (q < 0.05)
implemented in BrainVoyager (Genovese et al. 2002).
Regions of interest (ROIs) derived from both the main analysis and
the post hoc effective connectivity analyses were deﬁned by their
‘‘peak’’ voxel (for coordinates, see Table 1) and all contiguous voxels
that met the statistical threshold of P < 0.001 and fell within a cube
with 15 mm length, width, and depth centered on the peak voxel. The
average signal across voxels in the ROI was then submitted to a further
ROI general linear model (GLM) analysis. The betas from these
regression analyses provided estimates of the response to the
experimental conditions, which were subsequently analyzed with
analyses of variance (ANOVAs).
Results
Behavioral Data
For the analysis of the behavioral data, the detection rates in
the 3 conditions (insertion action, tool action, and object
control) and the 2 tasks (space and function) were entered into
a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Condition and
Task. Due to a computer error, the button press data from 2
subjects were not available, leaving 13 subjects for the be-
havioral analysis. The analysis did not reveal a main effect of
Task (F1,12 = 1.0), showing that overall the space and function
tasks were of similar difﬁculty. There was a marginally sig-
niﬁcant main effect of Condition (F2,24 = 3.3, P < 0.1, e = 0.79)
that was qualiﬁed by an interaction of Condition and Task
(F2,24 = 4.1, P < 0.05, e = 0.81). Post hoc t-tests showed that the
overall detection probabilities did not differ between the
insertion action condition and tool action condition (P = 0.13).
However, whereas for insertion actions the participants
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the design of the experiment, showing from top
to bottom: runs within the experiment, blocks within runs, trials within the blocks, and
the course of each trial.
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detected marginally more mismatches in the space task (M =
84%, s = 22%) than in the function task (M = 71%, s = 22%, P <
0.1), the opposite was the case for tool actions. Here, the
participants detected more mismatching actions in the func-
tion task (M = 91%, s = 13%) than in the space task (M = 79%, s =
21%, P < 0.05). This difference was predicted from prior
behavioral work showing that the space task for tools is more
complex because it involves the additional step of deriving
what the appropriate motor act for the given action would be
(Bach et al. 2005). For the object control condition, the detec-
tion rates in both tasks did not differ (space, M = 93%, s = 11%;
function, M = 82%, s = 28%, n.s.).
fMRI Data
The analysis of the fMRI data followed a 2-step procedure. First,
to identify brain areas involved in action comprehension as
opposed to areas more generally involved in representing
spatial and functional object features, we contrasted activation
for trials in the 2 action observation conditions (tool action and
insertion action) with those in the object control condition.
This comparison (FDR corrected at q < 0.05) revealed an
exclusively left-hemispheric network (Table 1 and Fig. 3; see
Supplementary Figs 2 and 3 for the activation in the 3 con-
ditions against baseline). It comprised brain structures typically
found in action observation tasks, such as the PMC and the
supramarginal gyrus (SMG) of the inferior parietal lobe (IPL). In
addition, regions along the anterior sections of the intraparietal
sulcus (aIPS) and a more rostral region in the mFG were
strongly activated. At a relaxed threshold (P < 0.001), activation
was also observed in the caudal sections of the intraparietal
sulcus (cIPS). The cIPS will also be discussed in the following,
as responses in this region are expected from prior work on
action and tool representation (Shikata et al. 2001, 2003;
Culham et al. 2003; Mahon et al. 2007). This left-hemisphere
action observation network was also robustly activated when
both tasks were compared separately against the object control
condition (Supplementary Fig. 1). Areas more strongly activated
for the object control condition than the action observation
condition included areas in the anterior and middle cingulate
cortices and in visual cortex (Supplementary Table 2).
To ensure that we did not miss any regions that play a role in
action as opposed to object judgments, we also computed the
whole-brain interaction contrast ((tools_space + inserts_space)
– (tools_function + inserts_function)) – ((2 3 objects_space) –
(2 3 objects_function)) to uncover regions showing different
involvements in the space and the function tasks in the 2 action
observation and object control conditions. In addition, we also
computed an interaction contrast for the 2 tasks in the 2 action
observation conditions ((tools_space + inserts_function) –
(inserts_space + tools_function)) to identify regions that play
different roles in the 2 tasks across action observation condi-
tions. However, neither of these analyses yielded any signiﬁcant
activation that would pass correction for multiple comparisons
at FDR (q < 0.05).
The next step was aimed at a more detailed investigation of
the role of the action-related areas in the 2 tasks and the 2
action observation conditions. We extracted GLM parameter
estimates for each ROI, subject, and condition. These values
were entered into a 3-way ANOVA with the factors Task (space
and function), Condition (insertion action and tool action), and
ROI (see Table 1). This ANOVA revealed a 3-way interaction of
Task, Condition, and ROI, indicating a differential involvement
of the regions in the 2 tasks and the 2 action observation
conditions (F5,70 = 2.6, P < 0.05, Huynh--Feldt e = 1).
To further characterize these ROIs, the parameter estimates
of each ROI were entered into separate ANOVAs with the fac-
tors Task (space and function) and Condition (insertion action
and tool action). Table 1 shows the resulting 2 main effect and
interaction terms for each of the ROIs; Figure 3 shows the beta
estimates in each of the ROIs for the 2 tasks and 3 action
observation conditions. As can be seen, all ROIs responded
strongly during the observation of implied actions but not (or
weakly) during the observation of objects.
The SMG was the only area that showed a main effect of
Condition, with overall stronger responses in the tool action
condition than in the insertion action condition. A main effect
of Task (space > function) was found in the PMC and all
parietal regions (SMG, aIPS, and cIPS), reﬂecting a stronger
overall involvement in the space task than in the function task.
In the PMC and SMG, this stronger involvement was inde-
pendent of the action observation condition and present both
in the tool action condition (P < 0.0005 for both) and in the
insertion action condition (SMG, P < 0.0005; PMC, P < 0.05).
In the cIPS, the main effect of Task was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁ-
cant interactionof Task andCondition. The cIPS respondedmore
strongly in the space task than in the function task in the tool
action condition (cIPS, t = 5.1, P < 0.0005), where spatiomotor
judgments required knowledge of object identity. In the inser-
tion action condition, however, where the space task could be
performed on the basis of immediate perceptual information
alone, this effectwas not present (t < 1). A similar (butmarginally
signiﬁcant) interaction was found in the aIPS region. Since for
the aIPS the stronger responses in the space task over the
function task were signiﬁcant for both the insertion action
condition and the tool action condition (P <0.0005 for both), the
interaction indicates a more pronounced difference in the tool
action condition relative to the insertion action condition.
The mFG was the only area in the action observation net-
work that did not show overall stronger responses in the space
task. Interestingly, the ANOVA revealed an interaction of
Condition and Task (Table 1), reﬂecting signiﬁcantly stronger
responses in the function task than in the space task in the
insertion action condition (t = 2.8, P < 0.02) but equal acti-
vation across both tasks in the tool action condition (t < 1),
where both functional and spatiomotor judgments required
knowledge of object identity.
We were also interested in the role the areas of the action
observation network play in the judgment of actions outside of
an action context. We therefore used simple t-tests to compare
activations in the space and function tasks in the object control
Table 1
Brain regions/Brodman areas (BAs) more activated in the 2 action observation conditions
(insertion-action, tool-action) than in the object control condition, and the P values of the effects
obtained in the subsequent ANOVAs in these regions
Region (BA) x, y, z t/mm3 Condition Task Task 3 condition
mFG (9) 46, 22, 35 6.69a/685 0.99 0.17 <0.05
PMC (6) 51, 4, 37 8.77a/1213 0.50 <0.01 0.35
SMG (40) 55, 28, 38 7.05a/1049 <0.01 <0.001 0.91
aIPS (40) 34, 41, 38 8.89a/1387 0.27 <0.001 0.08
cIPS (7) 19, 70, 49 4.51/131 0.76 <0.004 <0.05
Bold values indicate significant effects.
Notes: aPeak responses that pass an FDR threshold of q\ 0.05. Cluster extents are based on
thresholding at P\ 0.001, as used for the region of interest analysis.
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condition, where no actions were involved. We found stronger
responses in the space task than in the function task in all
premotor and parietal regions (P < 0.005 for PMC, SMG, and
aIPS; P < 0.05 for cIPS), suggesting that these regions are also
involved in deriving spatial relations between objects that are
not involved in an action. The mFG did not differentiate
between the 2 tasks in the object control condition.
Analysis of Effective Connectivity
The results of the ANOVAs carried out on the parameter
estimates for the mFG, aIPS, and cIPS (see above) revealed an
interaction of Task and Condition, suggesting a role in deriving
knowledge about how an action with the objects should be
performed in the space task of the tool action condition (see
Discussion). To further investigate these interactions, we per-
formed a functional connectivity analysis to identify regions to
which effective connectivity from these regions increases
in the space tasks of the tool action condition compared with
the insertion action condition. We employed BrainVoyager
Granger Causality Mapping Plug-In (Roebroeck et al. 2005) that
uses an autoregressive model to obtain Granger causality maps
(GCMs) between a reference ROI and all other recorded
voxels. Our TR of 3 s does not allow us to investigate direc-
tional ‘‘causal’’ inﬂuences (from the reference region to target
Figure 3. The upper panel shows areas activated more strongly in the 2 action observation conditions (tool action and insertion action) than in the object control condition
(thresholded at P\ 0.001, as used for the ROI analysis). The lower 3 panels show the beta estimates in the 3 experimental conditions (tool action, insertion action, object
control) and the two tasks (space, function). Left panel: region in the mFG with a selective engagement in spatial and functional tasks requiring object-based action knowledge.
Middle panel: premotor and supramarginal regions showing a stronger response for spatiomotor judgments in both action observation conditions. Right panel: intraparietal regions
showing stronger responses for spatiomotor judgments in the tool action condition, in particular.
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voxels of the brain or vice versa) but allows for identifying
voxels that show correlated time courses with the reference
region, within the experimental conditions of interest. Such
‘‘instantaneous’’ inﬂuence exists when the time course of the
reference ROI improves predictions of values of the target
voxels (or vice versa), taking into account the past of the
reference region and of the target voxels. Enhanced synchrony
with target voxels in one experimental condition over another
can be taken as an indicator of enhanced functional connec-
tivity that is not due to changes or synchronies in hemody-
namic response (cf. Roebroeck et al. 2005).
To test whether there are such differences in functional
connectivity between the space task of the tool action con-
dition and the insertion action condition, 2 GCMs were gen-
erated for each subject and each reference region, 1 for the
space task of the tool action condition and 1 for the space task
of the insertion action condition using each subject’s average
time course in the relevant ROIs as a reference (i.e., the mFG,
aIPS, and cIPS). Smaller ROIs (cubes with 10 mm side length,
centered on the peak voxel) were used than in the main
analysis to ensure consistency of the time course in the voxels
of the reference regions (R Goebel, personal communication).
For each of the 3 reference regions, a single-factor within-
subjects analysis of covariance was run on the data of all
subjects with the levels tool action and insertion action to
identify voxels that, across subjects, show stronger functional
connectivity with the reference region in the space task of the
tool action condition than the insertion action condition.
For the mFG, 2 regions showed changes in effective con-
nectivity for which the peak voxels passed correction for
multiple comparisons at FDR (q < 0.05) as shown in Figure 4a
and Table 2. One region was located in the anterior part of the
IPL and was directly adjacent/overlapping with the ROI in the
SMG. Indeed, an ANOVA performed on the beta estimates of
this new adjacent/overlapping region mirrored the results of
the SMG (Table 2) and revealed a stronger involvement in the
space task than in the function task in both the tool action
condition (t > 10, P < 0.001) and the insertion action condition
(t = 4.0, P < 0.005). The other region was located in the left
posterior middle temporal gyrus, where prior studies have
demonstrated selective responses for visual representations of
tools/artifacts over natural kinds (e.g., Chao et al. 1999, 2002;
Malach et al. 2002). Consistent with the idea that this region
provides knowledge about how the seen tools have to be used,
a Task 3 Condition ANOVA calculated on the parameter es-
timates of this region showed no main effects but a signiﬁcant
Task 3 Condition interaction (Table 2), with stronger re-
sponses for the space task over the function task in the tool
action condition (t = 2.9, P < 0.05) and marginally stronger
responses in the function task in the insertion action condition
(t = 2.0, P = 0.07). Thus, the effective connectivity analysis
supports the idea that the mFG interacts with regions involved
in the space task when knowledge about the objects used in
every trial is required (i.e., the tool action condition).
For the cIPS, 2 regions showed stronger effective connec-
tivity in the space task of the tool action condition than the
insertion action condition (see Fig. 4b and Table 2). One region
was found laterally to the aIPS ROI identiﬁed in the main
analysis and located in the inferior parietal lobule (see Table 2
for the results of the ANOVAs performed on these regions). It
responded more strongly in the space task than in the function
task in the tool action condition (left IPL, t = 4.1, P < 0.005),
where the space task required object-based action knowledge,
but not in the insertion action condition, where the space task
could be performed on the basis of directly available perceptual
features (t < 1.4). Increased effective connectivity was also
found to a region within the right inferior temporal lobe. The
peak coordinates place it in close proximity to the body-
selective extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al. 2001;
Peelen and Downing 2005) and motion-selective areas, in-
cluding human homologues of MT (Greenlee 2000). As was the
case for the IPL, this region responded more strongly in the
space task than in the function task, with the difference being
larger in the tool action condition (t = 4.2, P < 0.001) than in
the insertion action condition (t = 1.9, P = 0.08). For the aIPS
and the other regions that did not show a Task 3 Condition
Table 2
Brain regions/Brodman areas (BAs) identified by the functional connectivity analysis for the 2
reference regions (mFG, cIPS), and the P values of the effects obtained in the subsequent
ANOVAs in these regions
Region (BA) x, y, z F/mm3 Condition Task Task 3 condition
Changes in functional connectivity to the mFG
Left SMG (40) 52, 24, 40 26.6a/34 <0.05 <0.001 0.19
Left mTG (21/37) 51, 49, 2 28.3a/40 0.07 0.59 <0.005
Changes in functional connectivity to the cIPS
Left IPL (40) 45, 49, 52 33.6a/25 0.79 <0.05 0.08
Right iTG (37) 54, 61, 1 27.4a/104 <0.005 <0.005 0.09
Bold values indicate significant effects.
Notes: The F statistic reflects the difference in effective connectivity between the space task in
the tool action condition and in the insertion action condition. mTG, middle temporal gyrus; iTG,
inferior temporal gyrus.
aPeak responses that pass an FDR threshold of q\ 0.05. Cluster extents are based on
thresholding at P\ 0.001, as used for the region of interest analysis.
Figure 4. Regions showing significant changes in effective connectivity with the mFG (a) and cIPS (b) between the space task in the tool action condition, where the space task
depended on object use, and in the insertion action condition, where the space task was independent from object use (thresholded at P\ 0.001, as used for the ROI analysis).
Note that (b) also shows an additional cluster in the right IPL with enhanced connectivity to the cIPS that did, however, not pass correction for multiple comparisons at FDR (q\
0.05). Dotted circles show the approximate positions of the reference regions (a, mFG; b, cIPS, see also Fig. 3). mTG, middle temporal gyrus.
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interaction (i.e., the PMC and SMG), the functional connectivity
analysis did not reveal any signiﬁcant changes.
Correlations with Subjective Action Judgments
The participants ﬁlled out a questionnaire (described in detail
in Bach et al. 2005) that assessed for each of the actions 1) how
apparent its goal was, 2) how much visuomotor experience the
participants had with the action (how often they have seen and
performed the action), and 3) how strongly the instruments
and goal objects were associated with one another. One
participant did not ﬁll out the questionnaire and could not be
reached afterward. The questionnaire data were then corre-
lated for each participant, each stimulus condition and task
separately, with the brain activation in the ROIs when viewing
the corresponding actions. This analysis was based on 32
predictors, modeling the responses to each of the 8 different
actions in each of the 2 stimulus conditions and each of the 2
action judgment tasks. Table 3 shows the average Fisher-
transformed across-subjects correlations of the beta estimates
in the 6 ROIs and the ratings of the corresponding action. Each
cell reﬂects the average correlation with the different ratings
within a region, averaged across both tasks and both action
observation conditions. Simple t-tests (df = 13) against zero
were performed to assess the signiﬁcance level of the averaged
correlations for each ROI. As can be seen, across participants,
brain activity in all ROIs was signiﬁcantly stronger for those
actions with which the participants had less visuomotor
experience. In addition, brain activity in both the mFG and
the PMC was stronger for those actions for which the goal was
less apparent. None of the ROIs showed a relationship to the
participants’ subjective judgments of how strongly the instru-
ments and goal objects were associated.
Discussion
Previous research has focused on how others’ actions can be
recognized based on the motor behaviors performed. The
present study investigated the complementary pathways of
how the objects used can contribute to action understanding.
Participants judged 2-frame sequences of tool actions with
regard to either whether an action goal could, in principle, be
achieved by applying the objects to one another (function task)
or whether the objects were oriented correctly to each other
for the action to succeed (space task). These tasks should
engage regions that identify the actions (and their goals) on the
basis of the objects involved (function task) and those that
establish a spatiomotor representation of how the objects are
applied to one another (space task).
Compared with a tightly matched control condition, both
tasks activated a common left-hemispheric network. It in-
cluded regions in the dorsal PMC and the SMG that are also
involved in the observation of simple object-directed actions
(e.g., Buccino et al. 2001; Gre`zes et al. 2003). In addition,
regions in the mFG and along the IPS, speciﬁcally implicated in
representing learned knowledge how to ‘‘act with’’ tools (e.g.,
Buxbaum 2001; Johnson-Frey and Grafton 2003), were strongly
activated. The ﬁnding that both types of action judgments
activated the same regions within the network more strongly
than the control tasks reveals a speciﬁc tuning for processing of
action information and a tight coupling of spatiomotor and
goal-related action knowledge (Hodges et al. 2000; Bach et al.
2005; Ebisch et al. 2007). However, the extent to which these
regions were activated nevertheless differed between tasks and
action observation conditions. The data revealed a distinction
between regions involved in basic spatiomotor action repre-
sentation processes and additional regions that link the use of
tools not only to the goals that can be achieved with them but
also to how one has to act with these objects for the action
goals to be achieved.
Regions Deriving Spatiomotor Action Representations
The dorsal PMC and the SMG generally responded more
strongly in the space task than in the function task, indicating
a role in establishing a spatiomotor rather than goal-related
representation of the seen actions. Importantly, this stronger
involvement was found in both action observation conditions,
irrespective of whether the space task could be based on di-
rectly available perceptual information alone (insertion action
condition) or whether it required speciﬁc knowledge about
how to use the tools (tool action condition). These regions are
therefore unlikely to be involved in retrieving knowledge about
the correct way to handle the objects but instead provide
a more basic spatiomotor description of how the instrument is
aligned to the goal object, which is required in both conditions.
Very similar networks have been described for the core
‘‘mirror circuits,’’ in which observed actions are matched to
own action representations (e.g., di Pellegrino et al. 1992;
Gallese et al. 1996). Activation in these regions is often equated
with action understanding in general and the mapping of seen
actions onto the observers’ motor system (e.g., Buccino et al.
2001; Gre`zes et al. 2003; for reviews, see Rizzolatti and
Craighero 2004; Wilson and Knoblich 2005; Binkofski and
Buccino 2006). Our data suggest that in these regions this
matching is based on the actions’ spatiomotor attributes rather
than object or high-level goal information (see also, Brass et al.
2007; de Lange et al. 2008). Consistently, fMRI investigations
have indicated an encoding of spatiomotor properties of seen
actions in these regions, such as object affordances, hand
postures, or kinematics (e.g., Shmuelof and Zohary 2006;
Grafton and Hamilton 2007; Chong et al. 2008; Lestou et al.
2008). Moreover, the speciﬁc role in encoding spatial relation-
ship information found here is consistent with the role of these
regions during action execution, where they are involved in
spatially matching hands to goal objects (Binkofski et al. 1998;
Castiello 2005; Johnson-Frey et al. 2005; for reviews, see
Rizzolatti and Luppino 2001; Glover 2004; for tool actions, see
Goldenberg 2009) based on the ‘‘difference vectors’’ between
object features and actual hand postures (Shikata et al. 2003;
Frey et al. 2005; Tunik et al. 2005, 2008; Begliomini et al. 2007).
However, even though such a coding of spatial relationship
Table 3
Average across-person correlations of brain activity in the 6 ROIs and their ratings of the actions
seen at the same time, with regard to how apparent the actions’ goal is (goals), how much
sensorimotor experience the participants had with the actions (experience), and how much they
perceived the instruments and goal objects to be associated (association)
Region Goals Experience Association
mFG 0.13* 0.16** 0.07
PMC 0.11* 0.17** 0.03
SMG 0.11 0.29*** 0.01
aIPS 0.07 0.22*** 0.06
cIPS 0.08 0.17*** 0.02
Note: Significance was assessed with simple t-tests against zero (*P\ 0.05, **P\ 0.01,
***P\ 0.001).
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information is now well established for action execution, to
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to suggest that these
regions may support a similar type of processing during action
observation.
Regions Deriving Tool-Speciﬁc Spatiomotor Knowledge
The areas along the aIPS and caudal sections of the intraparietal
sulcus (cIPS) also responded more strongly in the space task
than in the function task. However, in these regions, these
stronger responses were more pronounced (for the aIPS) or
only observed (for the cIPS) in the tool action condition, where
the space task required knowledge about the proper way to act
with these objects. Whereas the more anterior premotor--SMG
circuits are involved in basic spatiomotor action representation
processes, the more posterior IPS regions may therefore
support these processes by providing information relevant for
how a tool has to be wielded to achieve the action’s goal, such
as its parts relevant for action (e.g., Goodale and Humphrey
1998; Creem and Profﬁtt 2001) or the hand postures required
for its use (Buxbaum et al. 2003, 2006; Daprati and Sirigu 2006).
A role in providing such acting with information is con-
sistent with lesion studies implicating these regions in deﬁcits
in skilled tool action knowledge during action execution (e.g.,
Liepmann 1920; Haaland et al. 2000; Buxbaum et al. 2007;
Goldenberg and Spatt 2009). Moreover, fMRI studies have
consistently demonstrated visual tool-speciﬁc responses in
these areas (e.g., Chao and Martin 2000; Rumiati et al. 2004;
Buxbaum et al. 2006) that suggest an automatic activation of
tool-speciﬁc motor skills (Kellenbach et al. 2003; Creem-
Regehr et al. 2007; Valyear et al. 2007). Similarly, the posterior
intraparietal regions are implicated in extracting spatial object
properties for action control (Shikata et al. 2001, 2003; Culham
et al. 2003) and are governed by action information associated
with the objects (Mahon et al. 2007).
The effective connectivity analysis provided further insights
into how tool-speciﬁc action knowledge is derived in the
posterior intraparietal areas. Several regions showed increased
effective connectivity with the cIPS during the space task of
the tool action condition when knowledge about how to use
a tool was required. One region was located in the right inferior
temporal gyrus, in close proximity to the body-selective EBA
(Downing et al. 2001). Effective connectivity also increased to
bilateral regions in the IPL, centrally implicated in representing
learned knowledge about how to act with objects (Johnson-
Frey and Grafton 2003; Boronat et al. 2005; Buxbaum et al.
2005). Indeed, the pattern of responses in both the temporal
and the parietal regions reveals a speciﬁc involvement in the
space task of the tool action condition, which required such
tool-speciﬁc action knowledge. When the space task is un-
predictable, the cIPS may therefore act as an interface between
basic spatiomotor representation of the seen objects and stored
knowledge about how one has to act with a given object to
achieve the actions’ goal.
An additional ﬁnding was that the parietal and premotor
areas that responded more strongly in the space task of the
action observation conditions showed similar differences in
the object control condition, even though the objects were
judged outside an action context. This suggests either that
spatiomotor action judgments make use of more basic pro-
cesses for visuospatial object analysis or, conversely, that object
orientation judgments employ action resources. Recent re-
search supports the latter view. Mental rotation of objects,
particularly tools, has been behaviorally shown to rely on motor
processes (e.g., Wohlschla¨ger and Wohlschla¨ger 1998) and
involves the same brain networks that support their actual
rotation (e.g., Vingerhoets et al. 2002; for a review, see Zacks
2008). Here, our correlational analysis relating brain activity to
the subjects’ subjective ratings of the stimuli supported an
action-related role. Particularly in the regions showing stronger
responses in the space task, brain activity was stronger for
those actions with which the subjects had less sensorimotor
experience. Such a dependence on prior experience has been
demonstrated before for mirror processing in behavioral and
imaging studies (Knoblich and Flach 2001; Calvo-Merino et al.
2005; Cross et al. 2006) and has also been demonstrated for
motor knowledge associated with tools (Vingerhoets 2008).
The correlational data therefore indicate that processing in
these areas is not related to abstract stimulus aspects but is
‘‘grounded’’ in the observer’s sensorimotor experience, with
processing being more difﬁcult the less familiar the actions
were.
Regions Deriving Functional Action Knowledge
The last remaining and most frontal region of the network was
the left mFG, a region consistently implicated in the re-
presentation of skilled action and associated with impairments
in skilled tool knowledge and ideomotor apraxia when lesioned
(Haaland et al. 2000; Goldenberg and Spatt 2009). The mFG
differed from all other regions in the action observation
network in that it was not speciﬁcally associated with the
space task. Rather, for insertion actions, it was more strongly
activated in the function task when participants had to decide
whether an action goal could be achieved with the objects.
This demonstrates a role in using object identity to derive what
the action is ‘‘for.’’ Importantly, however, in the tool action
condition, the mFG was not only engaged by these goal
judgments. Here, the difference disappeared and the mFG was
strongly and equally engaged by both tasks. This suggests that
the mFG is involved not only in deriving which goals can be
achieved with the objects but also in deriving how the objects
have to be applied to one another when this knowledge is
required in the space task of the tool action condition.
One way to interpret these ﬁndings is to assume that the
mFG holds relatively high-level goal-related action representa-
tions, in which the use of objects is linked both to the as-
sociated action goals and to knowledge about how they have to
be applied to one another for the actions to succeed. This
interpretation is consistent with behavioral work using the
same stimuli showing that deriving an action’s goals from
object identity automatically activates information about the
objects’ proper spatial alignment (Bach et al. 2005; see also, van
Elk et al. 2008). It is also consistent with imaging studies that
implicate the left mFG in accessing skilled actions from
memory, particularly on the basis of object information (i.e.,
‘‘action semantics,’’ cf. Hauk et al. 2004; Johnson-Frey 2004).
It is activated when participants derive action knowledge
associated with a tool (Grabowski et al. 1998; Weisberg et al.
2007) and, similar to what was found here, when knowledge
concerns a tool’s functional and motor properties (e.g., Ebisch
et al. 2007; for similar lesion data, see Goldenberg and Spatt
2009).
Although this proposal is preliminary, it was supported by
further analysis of our data. First, our analysis linking brain
activity to the participants’ subjective judgments of the actions
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supported a role in deriving action goals. Whereas in all other
regions of the action observation network brain activity pre-
dominantly varied with the subjects’ prior sensorimotor
experience with the actions, in the mFG (and potentially the
PMC), brain activity was additionally determined by the ap-
parentness of the actions’ goal, being stronger for those actions
for which the goal was harder to extract. Thus, the corre-
lational analysis supports the notion that the mFG represents
actions in a more high-level goal-related manner than the pre-
dominantly spatiomotor-attuned parietal--premotor networks.
Second, the analysis of effective connectivity supported the
proposed involvement in the space task, and that processing in
the mFG is based on object information. In the space task of the
tool action condition, effective connectivity increased, ﬁrst, to
a region in the left SMG, directly adjacent to/overlapping with
our SMG activation involved in basic spatiomotor processes.
Second, effective connectivity also increased to a region in the
left posterior middle temporal gyrus that has previously been
implicated in action observation and the visual representation
of tools and artifacts (e.g., Chao et al. 1999, 2002; Malach et al.
2002; Tyler et al. 2003). Responses in this area are primarily
stimulus driven rather than by the task (for a review, see
Noppeney 2008), consistent with a lack of activation when
compared with the control condition (in which similar body
parts and possible tool objects were presented). The effective
connectivity analysis therefore not only supports the notion
that the goal representations in the mFG interact with basic
spatiomotor processes. It also reveals an important contribu-
tion of the posterior temporal lobe to tool action observation
that was not identiﬁed by the main analysis, but which might
reﬂect the visual/semantic object representations on which
processing in the mFG is based.
Conclusions
This study provided evidence for a division of labor during tool
action observation. Whereas typical ‘‘mirror’’ regions in the
PMC and the SMG relied on directly perceivable aspects of the
objects to establish a basic spatiomotor description of how
the action is performed irrespective of the objects used, re-
gions along the IPS and in the mFG extracted action knowledge
based on the identities of the objects. Of these 2 regions, the
intraparietal regions appeared to be primarily concerned with
deriving tool-speciﬁc spatiomotor knowledge: how a tool
should be used motorically or which of its parts are relevant
for action. In contrast, the mFG appeared to derive more
general high-level action representations that are linked both
to information about the actions’ goal and to spatiomotor
knowledge about how the action has to be performed.
The distinction between the purely spatiomotor premotor--
inferior parietal systems and the frontoposterior parietal sys-
tems for supplying object information closely maps onto the
acting on and acting with streams described by Johnson-Frey
and Grafton (2003; see also Buxbaum 2001). Accordingly, the
premotor--parietal circuits instantiate evolutionary old systems
for interactions with objects based on their perceptual attri-
butes (acting on). In contrast, the acting with system, realized
in the IPL and the mFG, provides action schemata about the
skilled use of tools. The actual use of a tool requires the
cooperation of both these systems. Our current ﬁndings indi-
cate that very similar interactions and brain networks may be
involved in the observation of tool actions.
Funding
Wellcome Trust Programme grant awarded to S.P.T.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor
.oxfordjournals.org/
Notes
The authors would like to thank the radiographers at Ysbyty Gwynedd
Hospital, Bangor, North Wales. Conﬂict of Interest : None declared.
References
Bach P, Gunter TC, Knoblich G, Prinz W, Friederici AD. 2008. N400-like
negativities in action perception reﬂect two components of an
action representation. Soc Neurosci. 4(3):212--232.
Bach P, Knoblich G, Gunter TC, Friederici AD, Prinz W. 2005. Action
comprehension: deriving spatial and functional relations. J Exp
Psychol Hum Percept Perform. 31(3):465--479.
Baumgaertner A, Buccino G, Lange R, McNamara A, Binkofski F. 2007.
Polymodal conceptual processing of human biological actions in the
left inferior frontal lobe. Eur J Neurosci. 25(3):881--889.
Begliomini C, Caria A, Grodd W, Castiello U. 2007. Comparing natural
and constrained movements: new insights into the visuomotor
control of grasping. PLoS One. 2(10):e1108.
Binkofski F, Buccino G. 2006. The role of ventral premotor cortex in
action execution and action understanding. J Physiol. 99:396--405.
Binkofski F, Dohle C, Posse S, Stephan KM, Hefter H, Seitz RJ, Freund HJ.
1998. Human anterior intraparietal area subserves prehension:
a combined lesion and functional MRI activation study. Neurology.
50:1253--1259.
Boria S, Fabbri-Destro M, Cattaneo L, Sparaci L, Sinigaglia C, Santelli E,
Cossu G, Rizzolatti G. 2009. Intention understanding in autism. PLoS
One. 4(5):e5596doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.
Boronat C, Buxbaum LJ, Coslett H, Tang K, Saffran E, Kimberg D,
Detre J. 2005. Distinctions between manipulation and function
knowledge of objects: evidence from functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res. 23:361--373.
Botvinick MM, Buxbaum LJ, Bylsma LM, Jax SA. 2009. Toward an
integrated account of object and action selection: a computational
analysis and empirical ﬁndings from reaching-to-grasp and tool-use.
Neuropsychologia. 47(3):671--683.
Brass M, Schmitt R, Spengler S, Gergely G. 2007. Investigating action
understanding: inferential processes versus motor simulation. Curr
Biol. 17(24):2117--2121.
Buccino G, Binkofski F, Fink GR, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Gallese V, Seitz RJ,
Zilles K, Rizzolatti G, Freund HJ. 2001. Action observation activates
premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: an fMRI study.
Eur J Neurosci. 13:400--404.
Buxbaum LJ. 2001. Ideomotor apraxia: a call to action. Neurocase.
7:445--458.
Buxbaum LJ, Kyle KM, Grossman M, Coslett HB. 2007. Left inferior
parietal representations for skilled hand-object interactions: evi-
dence from stroke and corticobasal degeneration. Cortex.
43(3):411--423.
Buxbaum LJ, Kyle KM, Menon R. 2005. On beyond mirror neurons:
internal representations subserving imitation and recognition of
skilled object-related actions in humans. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res.
25(1):226--239.
Buxbaum LJ, Saffran EM. 1998. Knowing ‘how’ vs ‘‘what for’’: a new
dissociation. Brain Lang. 65:73--86.
Buxbaum LJ, Sirigu A, Schwartz M, Klatzky R. 2003. Cognitive re-
presentations of hand posture in ideomotor apraxia. Neuropsycho-
logia. 41(8):1091--1113.
Buxbaum LJ, Tyle KM, Tang K, Detre JA. 2006. Neural substrates of
knowledge of hand postures for object grasping and functional
object use: evidence from fMRI. Brain Res. 1117(1):175--185.
Calvo-Merino B, Glaser DE, Gre`zes J, Passingham RE, Haggard P. 2005.
Action observation and acquired motor skills: an fMRI study with
expert dancers. Cereb Cortex. 15:1243--1249.
Cerebral Cortex December 2010, V 20 N 12 2807
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on M
arch 8, 2012
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Canessa N, Borgo F, Cappa SF, Perani D, Falini A, Buccino G,
Tettamanti M, Shallice T. 2008. The different neural correlates of
action and functional knowledge in semantic memory: an FMRI
study. Cereb Cortex. 18(4):740--751.
Castiello U. 2005. The neuroscience of grasping. Nat Rev Neurosci.
6:726--736.
Chao LL, Haxby JV, Martin A. 1999. Attribute-based neural substrates in
temporal cortex for perceiving and knowing about objects. Nat
Neurosci. 2:913--919.
Chao LL, Martin A. 2000. Representation of manipulable man-made
objects in the dorsal stream. NeuroImage. 12:478--484.
Chao LL, Weisberg J, Martin A. 2002. Experience-dependent modulation
of category-related brain activity. Cereb Cortex. 12(5):545--551.
Chong T, Cunnington R, Williams M, Kanwisher N, Mattingley J. 2008.
fMRI adaptation reveals mirror neurons in human inferior parietal
cortex. Curr Biol. 18(20):1576--1580.
Creem SH, Profﬁtt DR. 2001. Grasping objects by their handles:
a necessary interaction between cognition and action. J Exp Psychol
Hum Percept Perform. 1:218--228.
Creem-Regehr SH, Dilda V, Vicchrilli AE, Federer FL, James N. 2007. The
inﬂuence of complex action knowledge on representations of novel
graspable objects: evidence from functional magnetic resonance
imaging. J Int Neuropsychol Soc. 13(6):1009--1020.
Cross ES, Hamilton AF, Grafton ST. 2006. Building a motor simulation de
novo: observation of dance by dancers. NeuroImage. 31(3):1257--1267.
Culham JC, Danckert SL, DeSouza JF, Gati JS, Menon RS, Goodale MA.
2003. Visually guided grasping produces fMRI activation in dorsal
but not ventral stream brain areas. Exp Brain Res. 153:180--189.
Daprati E, Sirigu A. 2006. How we interact with objects: learning from
brain lesions. Trends Cogn Sci. 10:265--270.
de Lange FP, Spronk M, Willems RM, Toni I, Bekkering H. 2008.
Complementary systems for understanding action intentions. Curr
Biol. 18:454--457.
di Pellegrino G, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Gallese L, Rizzolatti G. 1992.
Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Exp Brain
Res. 91:176--189.
Downing PE, Jiang Y, Shuman M, Kanwisher N. 2001. A cortical area
selective for visual processing of the human body. Science.
293:2470--2473.
Ebisch SJ, Babiloni C, Del Gratta C, Ferretti A, Perrucci MG, Caulo M,
Sitskoorn MM, Romani GL. 2007. Human neural systems for con-
ceptual knowledge of proper object use: a functional magnetic
resonance imaging study. Cereb Cortex. 17(11):2744--2751.
Frey SH. 2007. What puts the how in where: semantic and sensori-
motor bases of everyday tool use. Cortex. 43:368--375.
Frey SH, Vinton D, Norlund R, Grafton ST. 2005. Cortical topography of
human anterior intraparietal cortex active during visually guided
grasping. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res. 23(2--3):397--405.
Gallese L, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Rizzolatti G. 1996. Action recognition in
the premotor cortex. Brain. 119:593--609.
Genovese CR, Lazar NA, Nichols T. 2002. Thresholding of statistical
maps in functional neuroimaging using the false discovery rate.
NeuroImage. 15:870--878.
Glover S. 2004. Separate visual representations in the planning and
control of action. Behav Brain Sci. 27:3--78.
Goldenberg G. 2009. Apraxia and the parietal lobes. Neuropsychologia.
47(6):1449--1459.
Goldenberg G, Spatt J. 2009. The neural basis of tool use. Brain. 132:
1645--1655.
Goodale MA, Humphrey GK. 1998. The objects of action and
perception. Cognition. 67(1--2):181--207.
Grabowski TJ, Damasio H, Damasio AR. 1998. Premotor and prefrontal
correlates of category-related lexical retrieval. NeuroImage. 7(3):
232--243.
Grafton ST, Hamilton AF. 2007. Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of
action representation in the brain. Hum Mov Sci. 26(4):590--616.
Green CB, Hummel JE. 2006. Familiar interacting object pairs are
perceptually grouped. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform. 32(5):
1107--1119.
Greenlee MW. 2000. Human cortical areas underlying the perception of
optic ﬂow: brain imaging studies. Int Rev Neurobiol. 44:269--292.
Gre`zes J, Armony L, Rowe J, Passingham RE. 2003. Activations related to
‘‘mirror’’ and ‘‘canonical’’ neurones in the human brain: an fMRI
study. NeuroImage. 18:928--937.
Haaland KY, Harrington DL, Knight RT. 2000. Neural representations of
skilled movement. Brain. 123:2306--2313.
Hamilton AF, Grafton ST. 2006. Goal representation in human anterior
intraparietal sulcus. J Neurosci. 26:1133--1137.
Hauk O, Johnsrude I, Pulvermueller F. 2004. Somatotopic representa-
tion of action words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron.
41:301--307.
Hodges JR, Bozeat S, Lambon Ralph MA, Patterson K, Spatt J. 2000. The
role of conceptual knowledge in object use evidence from semantic
dementia. Brain. 123:1913--1925.
Hodges JR, Spatt J, Patterson K. 1999. ‘‘What’’ and ‘‘how’’: evidence for
the dissociation of object knowledge and mechanical problem-
solving skills in the human brain. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A.
96:9444--9448.
Iacoboni M, Woods RP, Brass M, Bekkering H, Mazziotta JC, Rizzolatti G.
1999. Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science. 286:
2526--2528.
Johnson-Frey SH. 2003. What’s so special about human tool use.
Neuron. 39:201--204.
Johnson-Frey SH. 2004. The neural bases of complex tool use in
humans. Trends Cogn Sci. 8(2):71--78.
Johnson-Frey SH, Grafton ST. 2003. From ‘‘acting on’’ to ‘‘acting with’’:
the functional anatomy of action representation. In: Prablanc C,
Pelisson D, Rossetti Y, editors. Space coding and action production.
New York: Elsevier. p. 127--139.
Johnson-Frey SH, Maloof FR, Newman-Norlund R, Farrer C, Inati S,
Grafton ST. 2003. Actions or hand-object-interactions: human
inferior frontal cortex in action observation. Neuron. 39:1053--1058.
Johnson-Frey SH, Newman-Norlund R, Grafton ST. 2005. A distributed
left hemisphere network active during planning of everyday tool
use skills. Cereb Cortex. 15(6):681--695.
Kellenbach ML, Brett M, Patterson K. 2003. Actions speak louder than
functions: the importance of manipulability and action in tool
representation. J Cogn Neurosci. 15(1):30--46.
Knoblich G, Flach R. 2001. Predicting the effects of actions: interactions
of perception and action. Psychol Sci. 12:467--472.
Koski L, Iacoboni M, Mazziotta JC. 2002. Deconstructing apraxia:
understanding disorders of intentional movement after stroke. Curr
Opin Neurol. 15(1):71--77.
Kourtzi Z, Kanwisher N. 2000. Activation in human MT/MST by static
images with implied motion. J Cogn Neurosci. 12(1):48--55.
Lestou V, Pollick F, Kourtzi Z. 2008. Neural substrates for action
understanding at different description levels in the human brain. J
Cogn Neurosci. 20:324--341.
Lewis JW. 2006. Cortical networks related to human use of tools.
Neuroscientist. 12:211--231.
Liepmann H. 1920. Apraxie: Brugschs Ergebnisse der Gesamten
Medizin. Berlin (Germany): Urban & Schwarzenberg.
Lindemann O, Stenneken P, van Schie HT, Bekkering H. 2006. Semantic
activation in action planning. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform.
32:633--643.
Mahon BZ, Milleville SC, Negri GAL, Rumiati RI, Caramazza A, Martin A.
2007. Action-related properties shape object representations in the
ventral stream. Neuron. 55(3):507--520.
Malach R, Levy I, Hasson U. 2002. The topography of high-order human
object areas. Trends Cogn Sci. 6(4):176--184.
Manthey S, Schubotz RI, von Cramon DY. 2003. Premotor cortex in ob-
serving erroneous action: an fMRI study. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res.
15:296--307.
Milner AD, Goodale MA. 1995. The visual brain in action. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nelissen K, Luppino G, Vanduffel W, Rizzolatti G, Orban GA. 2005.
Observing others: multiple action representation in the frontal lobe.
Science. 310:332--336.
Noppeney U. 2008. The neural systems of tool and action semantics: a
perspective from functional imaging. J Physiol Paris. 102(1--3):40--49.
Nowak MA, Plotkin JB, Jansen VAA. 2000. The evolution of syntactic
communication. Nature. 404:495--498.
2808 Tool Action Observation d Bach et al.
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on M
arch 8, 2012
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Ochipa C, Rothi LJG, Heilman KM. 1989. Ideational apraxia: a deﬁcit in
tool selection and use. Ann Neurol. 25:190--193.
Oztop E, Arbib MA. 2002. Schema design and implementation of the
grasp-related mirror neuron system. Biol Cybern. 87:116--140.
Peelen MV, Downing PE. 2005. Within-subject reproducibility of
category-speciﬁc visual activation with functional MRI. Hum Brain
Mapp. 25:402--408.
Proverbio AM, Riva F, Zani A. 2009. Observation of static pictures of
dynamic actions enhances the activity of movement-related brain
areas. PLoS One 4(5):e5389. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0005389.
Riddoch JM, Humphreys GW, Edwards S, Baker T, Wilson K. 2003.
Seeing the action: neurophysiological evidence for action-based
effects on object selection. Nat Neurosci. 6(1):82--89.
Rizzolatti G, Craighero L. 2004. The mirror neuron system. Annu Rev
Neurosci. 27:169--192.
Rizzolatti G, Luppino G. 2001. The cortical motor system. Neuron.
31:889--901.
Roebroeck A, Formisano E, Goebel R. 2005. Mapping directed inﬂuence
over the brain using Granger causality and fMRI. NeuroImage.
25:230--242.
Rozzi S, Ferrari PF, Bonini L, Rizzolatti G, Fogassi L. 2008. Functional
organization of inferior parietal lobule convexity in the macaque
monkey: electrophysiological characterization of motor, sensory
and mirror responses and their correlation with cytoarchitectonic
areas. Eur J Neurosci. 28(8):1569--1588.
Rumiati RI, Weiss PH, Shallice T, Ottoboni G, Noth J, Zilles K, Fink GR.
2004. The neural basis of pantomiming the use of visually presented
objects. NeuroImage. 21:1224--1231.
Shikata E, Hamzei F, Glauche V, Knab R, Dettmers C, Weiller C,
Buchel C. 2001. Surface orientation discrimination activates caudal
and anterior intraparietal sulcus in humans: an event-related fMRI
study. J Neurophysiol. 85:1309--1314.
Shikata E, Hamzei F, Glauche V, Koch M, Weiller C, Binkofski F,
Buchel C. 2003. Functional properties and interaction of the
anterior and posterior intraparietal areas in humans. Eur J Neurosci.
17:1105--1110.
Shmuelof L, Zohary E. 2006. A mirror representation of others’ actions
in the human anterior parietal cortex. J Neurosci. 26(38):
9736--9742.
Sirigu A, Duhamel J-R, Poncet M. 1991. The role of sensorimotor
experience in object recognition. A case of multimodal agnosia.
Brain. 114:2555--2573.
Sitnikova T, Kuperberg G, Holcomb PJ. 2003. Semantic integration in
videos of real-world events: an electrophysiological investigation.
Psychophysiology. 40(1):160--164.
Stu¨rmer B, Aschersleben G, Prinz W. 2000. Correspondence effects
with manual gestures and postures: a study of imitation. J Exp
Psychol Hum Percept Perform. 26(6):1746--1759.
Talairach J, Tournoux P. 1988. Co-planar stereotaxic atlas of the human
brain. New York: Thieme.
Tunik E, Frey SH, Grafton ST. 2005. Virtual lesions of the anterior
intraparietal area disrupt goal-dependent on-line adjustments of
grasp. Nat Neurosci. 8:505--511.
Tunik E, Lo O-Y, Adamovich SV. 2008. Transcranial magnetic
stimulation to the frontal operculum and supramarginal gyrus
disrupts planning of outcome-based hand-object interactions. J
Neurosci. 28(53):14422--14427.
Tyler LK, Stamatakis EA, Dick E, Bright P, Fletcher P, Moss H. 2003.
Objects and their actions: evidence for a neurally distributed
semantic system. NeuroImage. 18(2):542--557.
Urgesi C, Moro V, Candidi M, Aglioti SM. 2006. Mapping implied body
actions in the human motor system. J Neurosci. 26:7942--7949.
Valyear KF, Cavina-Pratesi C, Stiglick AJ, Culham JC. 2007. Does tool-
related fMRI activity within the intraparietal sulcus reﬂect the plan
to grasp? NeuroImage. 36:94--100.
van Elk M, van Schie HT, Bekkering. 2008. Conceptual knowledge for
understanding other’s actions is organized primarily around action
goals. Exp Brain Res. 189(1):99--107.
Villarreal M, Fridman EA, Amengual A, Falasco G, Gerscovich ER,
Ulloa ER, Leiguarda RC. 2008. The neural substrate of gesture
recognition. Neuropsychologia. 46(9):2371--2382.
Vingerhoets G. 2008. Knowing about tools: neural correlates of tool
familiarity and experience. NeuroImage. 40(3):1380--1391.
Vingerhoets G, de Lange FP, Vandemaele P, Deblaere K, Achten E. 2002.
Motor imagery in mental rotation: an fMRI study. NeuroImage.
17(3):1623--1633.
Weisberg J, van Turennout M, Martin A. 2007. A neural system for
learning about object function. Cereb Cortex. 17(3):513--521.
Wilson M, Knoblich G. 2005. The case for motor involvement in
perceiving conspeciﬁcs. Psychol Bull. 131:460--473.
Wohlschla¨ger A, Wohlschla¨ger A. 1998. Mental and manual rotation. J
Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform. 24(2):397--412.
Zacks JM. 2008. Neuroimaging studies of mental rotation: a meta-
analysis and review. J Cogn Neurosci. 20:1--19.
Cerebral Cortex December 2010, V 20 N 12 2809
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on M
arch 8, 2012
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
